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Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he
describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts
he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection.
In this paper, I disambiguate two senses of ‘perception of perfection’,
which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is
a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by
a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This
reading helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is
a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out
of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance’s power.
A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more
powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase
its power.
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1 Introduction
According to Leibniz, pleasure (voluptas/plaisir) is fundamental to the hap-
piness [beatitudo/bonheur ] of rational substances (see, e.g., GR II: 574; RB:
194, GR II: 579-84/SLT: 167-9), which is one of the perfections of the best of
all possible worlds (see, e.g. G IV: 462/AG: 68, L: 279).1 But Leibniz does not
have in mind any kind of pleasure, but specifically intellectual pleasure. That
1I employ the following abbreviations for primary texts: ‘A’: Sämtliche Schriften und
Briefe (cited by series, volume and page); ‘AG’: Philosophical Essays (cited by page); ‘E’:
1
is, the kind of pleasure which is (broadly construed) grounded in knowledge.2
The nature of Leibnizian happiness is usually treated in the literature in the
context of how God selects the best of all possible worlds, and correspond-
ingly how the perfections in this world are maximized. In world-selection,
must there be a tradeo↵ between metaphysical criteria (e.g. simplicity of
laws, harmony, diversity of phenomena) and moral criteria (happiness and
virtue), or can God maximize all of these perfections? (G IV: 431/AG: 39,
A IV: 615/R: 105; H: 188).3 There are a variety of responses to this ques-
tion in the literature,4 but I want to bracket this issue and address a more
God. Guil. Leibnitii Opera Philosophica (cited by page); ‘G’: Die philosophischen Schriften
von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (cited by volume and page); ‘GR’: Textes inédits d’après
de la bibliothèque provincial de Hanovre (cited by volume and page); ‘GW’: Briefwechsel
zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wol↵ (cited by page); ‘H’: Theodicy: Essays on the Good-
ness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil (cited by page); ‘L’: Philosophical
Papers and Letters (cited by page); ‘M’: Rechtphilosophisches aus Leibnizens ungedruck-
ten Schriften (cited by page); ‘MP’: Philosophical Writings (cited by page); ‘R’: Political
Writings (cited by page); ‘RB’: New Essays on Human Understanding (cited by page);
‘SLT’: The Shorter Leibniz Texts (cited by page); ‘W’: Leibniz Selections (cited by page).
2In what follows, it should be assumed that I am always speaking of intellectual pleasure
when I speak of ‘pleasure’, unless I explicitly mention sensory pleasure. Although there is
nothing inconsistent with saying that sensory pleasures may contribute to happiness, in
general, Leibniz clearly has in mind intellectual pleasure when he speaks of pleasure being
constitutive of happiness (see, e.g., RB: 194; H: 282, 297), and to the best of my knowledge,
he never claims that sensory pleasures have a role in happiness (GR II: 583/SLT: 170).
As Irwin writes, “Perhaps, then, Leibniz really means that happiness consists in pleasure
taken in appropriate activities and states” (2008: 316). As we will see below, I argue that
these “appropriate activities and states” are epistemic: intellectual pleasure is the kind of
pleasure that is (broadly construed) grounded in knowledge. This is the kind of pleasure
that Leibniz is mostly talking about when he uses ‘pleasure’ in an unspecified manner.
Sensory pleasure, as I understand it, is not grounded in knowledge. Rather, it is grounded
in confused perceptions of changes in the body. Although I am not concerned with the
nature of sensory pleasure in this paper, I will briefly discuss it in section 5.1.
3While it is clear that Leibniz claims that happiness is a perfection of the best of all
possible worlds, it is unclear what kind of perfection it is. Leibniz distinguishes between
metaphysical, physical, and moral perfection (H: 258). Strickland claims that happiness
corresponds to Leibniz’s use of ‘physical perfection’ (2006: 27). While I will refer to hap-
piness as a perfection, I will not come down on how to categorize this perfection.
4There are broadly two camps with respect to this question. First, there are commenta-
tors who claim that Leibniz is not concerned at all with the moral criteria (Coutarat 1901:
237, Russell 1937: 199). Second, there are commentators who claim there is no conflict
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fundamental one concerning the nature of happiness.
Leibnizian happiness, in and of itself, has not received a proper analysis,
and this is in part due to a lack of attention to the main component of happi-
ness, namely, pleasure. Moreover, when commentators do discuss Leibnizian
pleasure (mostly in passing) they are unclear about its nature, and this is in
part due to Leibniz’s di↵ering descriptions of pleasure. Some commentators
claim that pleasure is a perception of perfection. For example, Strickland
writes that “the path to happiness starts with a feeling or perception of per-
fection, and this very feeling is pleasure” (2006: 28).5 On this view, pleasure
is interpreted as an intentional state. When we experience pleasure we may,
for example, be aware of an instance of harmony in the world. Call this the
intentionalist reading. Other commentators claim that pleasure is caused by
a perception of perfection. For example, Brown writes that pleasure is “an
inner feeling that is produced by the perception of the perfection of an object”
(2011: 278, emphasis added).6 Given that such a reading does not a rm that
pleasure is a perception of perfection, it seems that on this view pleasure is a
non-intentional mental state. That is, pleasure is a mere feeling in the mind.
Call this the qualitative reading. To complicate matters, some commentators
slip between describing pleasure in both of these ways.7 Prima facie, these
readings are inconsistent: Leibnizian pleasure cannot be (wholly) intentional
and non-intentional.
In this paper, I reconcile this tension by arguing that pleasure is both
a perception of perfection and caused by a perception of perfection. This
requires distinguishing two senses of ‘perception of perfection’. Though he
is often unclear, Leibniz actually alternates between using ‘perception of
between the metaphysical and moral criteria (Blumenfeld 1995: 401, Grua 1953: 338-9,
Rutherford 1995: 47-9, Strickland 2006: 148).
5See also Jorati (2014: 757), Johns (2013: 118), Look (2007: 29), and Youpa (2005:
317).
6Similarly, Rutherford writes that “the best sort of pleasure is derived through the
distinct perception of perfection” (1995: 50).
7See, e.g., Brown (2011: 292, 301, cf. 1995: 413).
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perfection’ to designate an epistemic perception, that is, an item of knowledge,
and using ‘perception of perfection’ to designate a mere perception, that is,
a perceptual state that is intentional, but does not amount to knowledge. I
argue that pleasure is a perception of the latter type (a mere perception),
caused by a perception of the former type (an epistemic perception). Pleasure
arises from knowledge of the perfections of the universe and God, yet it is
an intentional state in its own right–it is a perception of a specific kind of
perfection.
What perfection, then, is pleasure about? I argue that pleasure consists in
a representation of an increase in a substance’s power (this is contrasted with
pain, which is a representation of a decrease in a substance’s power).8 That
pleasure has power as its object makes sense given Leibniz’s views on the
systematic relationship between knowledge, activity, power, and pleasure. In
the Discourse on Metaphysics §15, for example, Leibniz tells us that when a
rational substance acquires knowledge and thereby increases in power, such
increases are accompanied by experiences of pleasure (G IV: 440-1/AG: 48).
This reading of pleasure has the benefit of clarifying Leibnizian happiness
in two key respects. First, it helps us understand the cognitive status of hap-
piness. For Leibniz, happiness is a cognitive process (akin to what we would
now call a mood). This cognitive process amounts to an enduring state of joy,
which consists of a predominance of pleasure over pain. Rational substances
are happy when they are, on balance, more powerful than they are weak,
and have a stable awareness of their power, and are consistently engaging
in activities that increase their power. Second, it helps us understand why
8Frey comes close to claiming that pleasure is about power: “attainment or the exercise
of the perfection of the power is intrinsically pleasing to the agent who possesses the power,
and so knowledge is intrinsically pleasing to rational minds” (2016: 617). Frey claims, at
the very least, that exercising the perfection of power causes an experience of pleasure, but
she does not make the separate claim that pleasure is about or represents the perfection
of power. Hostler also approaches my reading, claiming that pleasure is about increasing
perfection, but he does not specify the nature of this perfection that is increasing (1975:
23).
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Leibniz claims that happiness is a perfection (see, e.g., L: 279). Happiness is
a perfection of rational substances because in virtue of being constituted by
consistent and stable representations of power (a metaphysical perfection in
its own right), happiness by extension acquires the status of a perfection as
well.
2 Preliminaries: The Intentionalist and Qual-
itative Readings in Focus
Before proceeding, an important–and extended–clarification is in order about
the reconciliation on o↵er. There are generally two issues concerning the
nature of mental states like pleasure and pain. First, there is the question of
the a↵ective nature of pleasure, that is, the way in which pleasure feels to the
subject. Often, it is claimed that pleasure has a positive valence, while pain
has a negative valence (see, e.g., Bain & Brady 2014). The a↵ective nature of
pleasure is often taken as a datum for any theory of pleasure.9 Second, there
is a further question of the intentionality of pleasure, i.e. whether pleasure
has content.10 Does pleasure intrinsically tell us anything about ourselves or
environment?
There are broadly three approaches to tackling these two issues. First,
one might claim that pleasure is wholly a↵ective, and that it does not have
content–it is a mere feeling in the mind (see, e.g., Bramble 2013). This is
the qualitative reading above. Second, one might say that pleasure is wholly
9Leibniz would surely agree that pleasure and pain have a↵ective components, indeed
it is hard to read him as talking about pleasure and pain if he did not think they were
a↵ective in some way. Of course, however, this is something that he does not discuss
explicitly (but again, this could be just because it is an obvious point). Nonetheless, the
a↵ective nature of pleasure and pain is suggested by his claims that experiences of pleasure
are pleasant or delightful and that experiences of pain involve su↵ering (RB: 162-8).
10By ‘content’, I mean intentional content, that is, content that is semantically evaluable.
Of course, there is a general sense in which non-intentional qualitative mental properties
or states have content, in that there is something phenomenologically given in those states
or properties (Montague 2016).
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intentional, and that its a↵ective qualities are exhausted by its intentional
content (see, e.g., Tye 1995). This is a strong version of the intentionalist
reading. Third, one might say that pleasure is a mixed state: it has an a↵ec-
tive component that is non-intentional, and a separate intentional component
(see, e.g., Block 1995: 269). This is a weak version of the intentionalist read-
ing.
As I understand Leibniz, he cannot accept the qualitative reading, be-
cause he claims that the perceptual states of a substance are representational
(or so I will argue). However, he is not necessarily committed to the claim
that every perceptual state of a substance is wholly representational. With
that said, it would seem that both the weak and strong intentionalist read-
ings are technically available to Leibniz. However, as will become clear, the
weak intentionalist reading will be eliminated because Leibniz claims that,
at least in the case of pleasure, the essence of pleasure consists in its be-
ing a perception of perfection. And as I read Leibniz, this is a claim about
the essential representationality of pleasure. Thus, I will argue for a strong
intentionalist reading of Leibnizian pleasure.
Nonetheless, ascribing strong intentionalism to Leibniz raises some impor-
tant questions about pleasure and its a↵ective status. Philosophers working
on pleasure and pain are often first and foremost concerned with the a↵ective
nature of these mental states, even if they go in for a strong intententionalist
reading. Thus, one explanatory challenge for a strong intentionalist reading
is to explain how the content of pleasure accounts for its a↵ective qualities
(see, e.g., Cutter & Tye 2011, Bain 2003).11 Not losing sight of the a↵ective
nature of pleasure is important for a variety of reasons. First, the a↵ective na-
ture of pleasure is often connected to its motivational status. Leibniz clearly
recognizes that pleasure is a driving force in action–indeed, he is often char-
acterized as a hedonist (see, e.g., L: 136, L: 424).12 Second, and relatedly,
11This is not a problem for the weak intentionalist reading, for a separate non-intentional
a↵ective component of pleasure is already being admitted.
12For hedonist readings of Leibniz see, e.g, Hostler (1975: 47) and Brown (1995: 413,
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one might wonder how pleasure as a representational state is di↵erent from
other mental states that are not pleasures, yet represent the same property.
In the present case, the issue concerns how Leibnizian pleasures are distinc-
tive in the way that they represent power, for surely there are other mental
representations of power that are distinct from pleasure.
I think that Leibniz has the resources to meet these explanatory de-
mands, but he clearly does not always approach pleasure with such issues
in mind, and thus the texts are underdetermined. For him, the main puz-
zle is just to explain what pleasure is about and ground that explanation in
his broader metaphysical and epistemological system. Correspondingly, that
will be my primary interpretive task here. To be clear, I think that a strong
intentionalist reading must say something about how the a↵ective nature
of pleasure is exhausted by its intentional content. And I will provide an
explanation–albeit speculative–about how this might work. However, while a
strong intentionalist ought to have a story about these further related ques-
tions (e.g. motivation)–it need not provide them immediately to deserve a
seat at the table.13 While I will briefly develop a view about the a↵ective
nature of pleasure, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address these more
fine-grained issues in detail, and thus I will generally bracket the relation-
ship between the intentional, a↵ective, and motive aspects of pleasure. But
the interpretation developed here will surely lay the groundwork for tackling
these issues in future work.14
2011). For an argument against the hedonist reading see Frey (2016).
13One reason for thinking that Leibniz is doing something novel in his analysis of pleasure
is that he is departing from a qualitative reading of sensations and emotions that was,
arguably, dominant in the early modern period. Indeed, commentators have often claimed
that the Cartesians were qualia realists, who did not view sensations and emotions as
having any content. To be sure, it is unclear whether Leibniz interpreted the Cartesians
in this way, but that is besides the point. For qualia realist readings of the Cartesians see
MacKenzie (1990), Field (1993), and Cunning (2006). For intentionalist readings see De
Rosa (2007), Gottlieb & Parvizian (2018), and Simmons (1999).
14Going forward, I will drop the qualification of ‘strong’ when referring to the intention-
alist reading I am developing–unless specifying so is required for clarity.
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3 Two Senses of ‘Perception of Perfection’
3.1 Conflicting Texts
Admittedly, the texts seem unclear about the nature of pleasure. In sup-
port of the intentionalist reading, one could cite texts such as the following:
“pleasure consists in the perception of perfection [perceptione perfectionis ]”
(MP: 147/G VII: 291); “pleasure is the feeling of a perfection or an excel-
lence [die Empfindung einer Vollkommenheit oder Vortre✏ichkeit ]” (G VII:
86/L: 425); “pleasure. . . is nothing other than the feeling of some perfection”
(W: 567); “pleasure is the sensation of perfection [sensus perfectionis ]” (AG:
233/GW: 172); and pleasure is “nothing other than a sense of perfection
[sensum perfectionis ]” (GW: 18).15
In support of the qualitative reading, one could cite texts such as the
following: pleasure “is permanent and cannot deceive, nor can it cause a
future unhappiness if it arises from knowledge” (G VII: 88/L: 426); and
“pleasure is the feeling of some perfection, and this perfection which causes
pleasure can be found not only in ourselves, but also elsewhere” (GR II:
579/SLT: 169). The latter text used in support of the qualitative reading
is particularly noteworthy. Leibniz starts o↵ with seemingly intentionalist
language: “pleasure is the feeling of some perfection”. However, he then seems
to indicate that a causal (not intentional) relationship holds between pleasure
and perfection: “this perfection which causes pleasure.” Since a perfection
cannot immediately cause a pleasure given Leibniz’s denial of genuine inter-
substantial causation (Monadology §7, G VI: 607/AG: 213-4), it is natural
to read Leibniz as claiming that a perception of perfection mediately causes
pleasure, which should then be understood as a mere feeling, i.e. a non-
intentional state.
Undoubtedly, there is a causal story to be told about how pleasures are
15Letter to Christian Wol↵ 21 February 1705, Translated by Strickland
(http://www.leibniz-translations.com/wol↵.htm).
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generated, but I think we have every reason to be suspicious of a qualita-
tive reading right o↵ the bat. One of the essential features of substances,
particularly rational substances, is that their perceptual states express—i.e.
represent—other substances and the universe. As Leibniz tells us in the Mon-
adology (1714), “each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the
universe” (G VI: 616/AG: 220) and “the nature of the monad is represen-
tative [représentative]” (G VI: 617/AG: 220; see also G IV: 434/AG: 42, G
VI: 598/AG: 207, G VI: 604/AG: 211). Leibniz has a distinctive theory of
representation or expression, and for present purposes, we need not delve
into the details of that theory.16 All we need to know is that, for Leibniz,
perceptions have representational content, and at the very least, we can say
that perceptions represent some feature of the universe or God. Thus, we
should try to work out some type of intentionalist reading.
One might try to push back on the representationalist reading of plea-
sure, by arguing that pleasures are appetites, not perceptions. As is well-
known, Leibniz divides the mental states of a monad into appetites and
perceptions.17 While it seems clear that perceptions are representational, it
is unclear whether appetites–the strivings toward other perceptions–must be
representational as well (Simmons 2001: 41-2, fn. 19). However, the problem
with this move should be clear: Leibniz, in much of the texts we will con-
sider, consistently describes pleasure as a perception. Indeed, nowhere does
he claim or imply that pleasure is an appetite. Moreover, as we will see later,
Leibniz clearly claims that the essence of pleasure consists in its being a per-
ception of perfection. Thus, much work needs to be done to re-read Leibniz’s
claim that pleasure is a perception of perfection, as the claim that pleasure
is (say) an appetite for perfection.
The interpretive challenge before us, then, is to provide an intentionalist
16For discussions of Leibniz’s theory of representation see Adams (1994: 222-3), Duncan
(2015), McRae (1976: 20-26), Rescher (1967: 61-3), Rutherford (1995: 38-9), Simmons
(2001), and Wilson (1992).
17For in depth discussion of Leibnizian appetites see Jorati (2018) and Lee (2014).
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reading that can explain two Leibnizian commitments concerning the nature
of pleasure:
1. Pleasure is a perception of perfection.
2. Pleasure is caused by a perception of perfection.
I believe that Leibniz has the resources to answer this challenge. Before con-
sidering my proposed solution, however, it will be instructive to consider an
intentionalist reading of pleasure that is akin to the one I will o↵er, but one
that I want to reject.
3.2 The Epistemic Reading
On an epistemic reading, in claiming that intellectual pleasure is a perception
of perfection, Leibniz is really saying that pleasure consists in knowledge of
perfection. For example, Andrew Youpa writes that “pleasure is the sense
perception or knowledge of perfection” (2005: 317, see also 2016). It is clear
that Youpa must have intellectual pleasure in mind, given that he identifies
pleasure with a kind of knowledge.
The epistemic reading is not unmotivated. Leibniz clearly indicates a
close connection between the acquisition of knowledge and pleasure, and he
also appeals to knowledge in order to distinguish intellectual pleasure, the
type of pleasure that can be constitutive of genuine happiness, from sensory
pleasure, the type of pleasure that not only cannot be constitutive of genuine
happiness but is often a barrier to it (GR II: 579-80/SLT: 170). Furthermore,
this reading can meet our interpretive challenge. If one stipulates that the
use of ‘perception of perfection’ in the context of descriptions of pleasure
is synonymous with ‘knowledge’, one could say that pleasure is a kind of
knowledge that is caused by other perceptions of perfection. So, it seems
that the epistemic reading has a lot going for it.
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But what exactly is the epistemic reading claiming in saying that “plea-
sure is knowledge”? Let us disambiguate three readings of this view. The
first two readings–based on the is of predication–are:
ER1: Every instance of pleasure is an instance of knowledge of perfec-
tion.
ER2: Every instance of knowledge of perfection is pleasurable.18
The third reading–based on the is of identity–is:
ER3: Every instance of pleasure is an instance of knowledge of perfec-
tion and every instance of knowledge of perfection is an instance
of pleasure.
The real epistemic readings of pleasure are ER1 and ER3. ER2 is not truly
an epistemic reading, but it is worth considering here as it will help clarify
my considered view on the relationship between knowledge and pleasure. I
will provide brief arguments against all three readings. It should be noted,
however, that if ER1 is false, then a fortiori ER3 is false as well.
Regarding ER1: as a sensible quality,19 pleasure is simply not the type
of mental state that could count as knowledge.20 In Meditations on Knowl-
edge, Truth, and Ideas (1684) Leibniz o↵ers us a sketch of his epistemology.
Leibniz distinguishes di↵erent grades of knowledge (cognitio), and it is clear
from his descriptions of these di↵erent grades of knowledge that knowledge
18ER2 is distinct from the claim that the pursuit of knowledge is pleasurable. The pursuit
of knowledge might not be successful, as one could fail to achieve knowledge, which is why
I am not concerned with this view as a real iteration of the epistemic reading.
19The claim that pleasure is a sensible quality is merely the claim that pleasure is simple
in that we cannot analyze it–through itself–into discrete requirements (Adams 1994: 120).
20There is a more direct argument that can be made to this e↵ect, but which cannot
be placed on the table just yet. Pleasure is a mere perception, that is, an expressive or
representational state, but such perceptions in and of themselves are not items of knowl-
edge. As McRae points out, “Leibniz makes it clear that he does not equate expressing
with thinking or knowing” (1976: 20).
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involves ideas, notions, or concepts (Leibniz alternates between these terms
in this text). For example, Leibniz writes: “When everything that enters into
a distinct notion [notitiam distinctam] is, again, distinctly known, or when
analysis has been carried to completion, then knowledge is adequate” (G IV:
423/AG: 24). In short, while one can have some grade of knowledge about
an instance of pleasure–e.g. through a distinct notion of that pleasure21–the
pleasure itself cannot be an item of knowledge.22
Regarding ER3: Leibniz draws a clear metaphysical distinction between
knowledge of perfection and pleasure. Here, I want to consider one important
text. In the Principles of Nature and Grace (1714), Leibniz says the following
about the beatific vision:
For the love of God also fulfills our hopes, and leads us down
the road of supreme happiness [bonheur ], because by virtue of
the perfect order established in the universe, everything is done
in the best possible way, both for the general good and for the
greatest individual good of those who are convinced of this, and
who are content with divine government, which cannot fail to be
found in those who know how to love the source of all good. It is
true that supreme felicity [felicité] (with whatever beatific vision
or knowledge of God it may be accompanied [accompagnée]) can
never be complete, because, since God is infinite, he can never be
entirely known. (G VI: 606/AG: 213)
If ER3 were correct, then surely Leibniz would claim that the beatific vi-
sion, i.e. unmediated knowledge of the perfections of God, is an instance of
pleasure. Indeed, the beatific vision would be a prime candidate for ER3.
However, we see here that Leibniz implies a distinction between the beatific
21That we can have a distinct notion of pleasure follows from Leibniz’s claim that we
have a real definition of pleasure–see section 3.4 below.
22For more on Leibniz’s epistemology, see McRae (1995).
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vision and the supreme felicity that accompanies it. Though the beatific vi-
sion might always be accompanied by pleasure and happiness, there remains
a strict distinction between these two mental states (see also H: 297).23
Regarding ER2: I read ER2 as the claim that pleasure and knowledge are
distinct (it does not presuppose ER1 or ER3), but knowledge of perfection
is pleasurable because it is always accompanied by pleasure (a distinct men-
tal state). It might have seemed that I was implicitly a rming ER2 in my
response to ER3–but this is not the case.
The reason for rejecting ER2 is that Leibniz allows for the possibility of
a rational substance to have knowledge of perfection yet not experience any
accompanying pleasure. This is because, for Leibniz, in order for pleasure to
be sustained in a rational substance such that it can contribute to happiness,
the rational substance must be making epistemic progress. I would like to
distinguish two kinds of epistemic progress in Leibniz’s system. First, there
is epistemic progress when a rational substance acquires new knowledge. The
texts generally have this kind of epistemic progress in mind. For example,
Leibniz writes:
Thus our happiness [bonheur ] will never consist, and must never
consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and
which would dull our mind, but must consist in a perpetual
progress (progrès perpétuel) to new pleasures and new perfec-
tions. (G VI: 606/AG: 213; see also RB: 194)
The thought here is that happiness is, in some sense, grounded in a progres-
23The beatific vision might be a special case of knowledge that is always accompanied
by pleasure. As Leibniz writes in the Principles of Nature and Grace: “Since God is the
most perfect and happiest, and consequently, the substance most worthy of love, and since
genuinely pure love consists in the state that allows one to take pleasure in the perfections
and felicity of the beloved, this love must give us the greatest pleasure of which we are
capable whenever God is its object” (G VI: 605/AG: 212, see also SLT: 161). This is not
a counterexample to my argument against ER2 below, however, because it is still not the
case that every instance of knowledge of perfection is accompanied by an experience of
pleasure.
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sion of pleasures. And supposing that pleasure is grounded, in some sense,
in knowledge of perfection, if we cease to acquire new knowledge, then we
will cease to acquire new pleasures (and thus our happiness will be compro-
mised). This first kind of epistemic progress seems to imply that unless an
item of knowledge is novel, then it will not be productive of pleasure. Call
this strong epistemic progress.
Given Leibniz’s commitment to strong epistemic progress, one might
think that the objection to ER2 is that common or familiar knowledge will
not be accompanied by pleasure. However, this is not the case. For surely, a
rational substance can reflect on their current body of knowledge or apply
previously acquired knowledge to further matters, and still experience plea-
sure. For example, consider the advanced theologian who reflects on their
knowledge of the attributes of God. They may not be refining their knowl-
edge of the attributes at all, nonetheless, such reflection does involve a kind
of epistemic progress, and thus that knowledge will still be productive of
pleasure. Call this weak epistemic progress.
Through distinguishing strong and weak epistemic progress (both of which
are consistent and not mutually exclusive), we can now unveil the real ob-
jection to ER2. In both strong and weak epistemic progress, the knowledge
that is productive of pleasure is always conscious knowledge. In the case of
strong epistemic progress, knowledge of perfection is pleasurable because we
have just acquired it (and are thus conscious of it), and in the case of weak
epistemic progress, knowledge of perfection is pleasurable because we are
occurrently reflecting on it. This suggests that if we truly “dull our mind”,
that is, no longer consciously engage our knowledge, then that knowledge
will no longer be productive of pleasure. Consider the theologian who spends
ten years of his life learning about the attributes of God, but then abandons
his theological studies to pursue some other a↵airs, and never considers the
attributes of God again. Surely, we would say that this theologian still has
knowledge of God. Indeed, if prompted, he might be able to produce an on-
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tological argument for God’s existence. But insofar as his knowledge is now
dormant, it will not be a source for renewing pleasure and sustaining happi-
ness. In short, I am saying that Leibniz rejects ER2 because he is committed
to the claim that Conscious Knowledge is Pleasurable:
CP: Every (conscious) instance of knowledge of perfection is pleasur-
able.
But again, to accept this claim does not entail that pleasure is knowledge.
3.3 The Dual Perception of Perfection Reading
So, the epistemic reading is not viable. How, then, can we meet our interpre-
tive challenge and reconcile the allegedly conflicting texts? I think that the
tension is generated by confusion over what Leibniz means by phrases such
as ‘perception of perfection’, ‘feeling of perfection’, and so on. I suggest that
we disambiguate two senses of ‘perception of perfection’. In some instances,
Leibniz uses ‘perception of perfection’ to indicate a perception that amounts
to knowledge. For short, let us call these perceptions epistemic perceptions.
In other instances, however, Leibniz uses ‘perception of perfection’ to indi-
cate a perception of perfection that is intentional, but does not amount to
knowledge. For short, let us call these (conscious) perceptions mere percep-
tions.24 I argue that, pleasure consists in a representation of an increase in a
24Another clarification is in order about my use of the term ‘pleasure’. Leibniz draws
a distinction between ‘semi-pleasures [demi-plaisir ]’ and ‘a whole, genuine pleasure [un
plaisir entier et véritable]’. Semi-pleasures are unconscious “minute perceptions” which
when accumulated become a conscious genuine pleasure (RB: 165). While I think it is
clear that genuine pleasures are intentional and have an a↵ective felt quality, it is less
clear whether semi-pleasures are intentional or have an a↵ective felt-quality. In what fol-
lows, I am concerned only with conscious or genuine pleasures, and will not address the
transformation of semi-pleasures (possibly non-intentional and not a↵ective) into genuine
pleasures. With that said, in explaining the connections and transformation between semi-
pleasures and genuine pleasures, one must respect Leibniz’s commitment to the Principle
of Continuity. For an analysis of how the Principle of Continuity relates to perceptions
see Jorgensen (2009).
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substance’s power (this is contrasted with pain, which is a representation of
a decrease in a substance’s power). Drawing from a variety of texts,25 I argue
that pleasure is a mere perception caused by an epistemic perception. That
is, pleasure arises from knowledge of the perfections of the universe and God,
yet it is also an (intentional) perceptual state. Call this the dual perception
of perfection reading.
An important clarification about my critique of the epistemic reading is
in order. My problem with the epistemic reading is not with its implicit claim
that a perception of perfection can be understood as an instance of knowl-
edge.26 Rather my gripe is with the claim that pleasure qua perception of per-
25I will help myself to a methodological assumption in this paper, namely, that Leibniz
has a philosophical system and is thus a systematic philosopher (Whipple 2015). Unlike
developmental or modular interpretations of Leibniz (Garber 2014), which argue that
Leibniz is merely testing out and developing di↵erent theories, I maintain that Leibniz
does have settled philosophical positions–at least on the central issues–and these positions
are interconnected with one another. And I take it that the nature of happiness–and
consequently pleasure–is a central issue in Leibniz’s philosophy, and that it would be
unacceptable to pin him with having an unclear–let alone inconsistent–account of pleasure
and happiness. Nonetheless, as interpreters of Leibniz are all too familiar with, one can find
a variety of inconsistent passages in Leibniz on any given philosophical issue. I will note
conflicting passages when relevant, however, my aim is to present what I take Leibniz’s
considered position on pleasure to be, and I will not provide reconciliations for every
conflicting passage. For an account of systematic philosophy that I am sympathetic to, see
Nelson (2013).
26Admittedly, one might naturally think that Leibniz is being sloppy in claiming that
knowledge could be a property of a perception, given that when he is careful he claims that
knowledge is a property of ideas, notions, or concepts. We need to distinguish two issues
here. First, there is the question of whether a perception of perfection (excluding pleasure
since it is a sensible quality) can be characterized as an instance of knowledge. Second,
there is the question of whether pleasure is, in any sense, caused by a mere perception of
perfection. On the first issue: I think this is open to interpretation. While there are texts
that one could use to argue against this view, there are texts where Lebniz can be read
as claiming that knowledge can be a property (of at least some kinds) of perceptions. For
example, Leibniz writes in the Principles of Nature and Grace: “the soul itself knows the
things it perceives only so far as it has distinct and heightened perceptions [perceptiones
distinctes et reveleées ]” (G VI: 605/AG: 211). But given that Leibniz claims that pleasure
must be immediately caused by knowledge of perfection, it is reasonable to reconcile the
conflicting texts by claiming that when he says pleasure must be caused by a perception
of perfection, he means knowledge of perfection. On the second issue: suppose one wants
to deny that knowledge can be a property of perception, yet still concede that pleasure
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fection is always an instance of knowledge.27 On my view, pleasure is a mere
perception of perfection–a representational state–which in the right kind of
circumstances arises from knowledge. But this does not entail a commitment
to ER2, for my contention is that, in the right circumstances, knowledge of
perfection is pleasurable. As indicated above, there are important exceptions
to ER2 that we must acknowledge to understand Leibnizian happiness.
There are a variety of texts which suggest the dual perception of perfection
reading. Admittedly, however, they are not all knock-down texts. Here, I just
want to consider several texts that demonstrate the link between knowledge
of perfection and pleasure. Let us start by considering the following passages:
It is one of the eternal laws of nature that we shall enjoy the
perfection of things and the pleasure which results from it, only in
the measure of our knowledge, our good will, and our contribution
to this perfection. (G VII: 89/L: 427)
[pleasure] is lasting and cannot deceive, nor give rise to a future
sorrow, as long as it derives from knowledge and brings with it a
light from which results an inclination to good in the will, that
is, virtue. (G VII: 88/L: 426)
We must not distrust the pleasures that arise from intelligence
or reasons, when we penetrate the reason of the reason of perfec-
tions, that is to say, when we see them follow from their source,
which is the absolutely perfect being. (GR II: 580/SLT: 168)
In all of these passages Leibniz claims–amongst other things–that pleasure
is somehow grounded in knowledge of perfection. This suggests that when
must be caused by knowledge of perfection. Still one cannot deny the claim that, in a
general sense, pleasure is distally caused by a mere perception of perfection. For one does
not immediately acquire knowledge of a perfection, rather knowledge of a perfection in
part derives from mere perceptions of a perfection. As such, I think for the present task
at hand, this worry is a non-starter.
27Again, part of the reason for this is the kind of mental state that pleasure is, i.e. a
sensible quality.
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Leibniz claims that pleasure is caused by a perception of perfection, he is
implying that pleasure is caused by knowledge of perfection.
Now consider the following extended text from Happiness (La Felicité ca.
1694):
Pleasure is the feeling of some perfection [le sentiment de quelque
perfection], and this perfection that causes [cause] pleasure can
be found not only in us, but also elsewhere. For when we notice it,
this very knowledge [conaissance] excites some perfection in us,
because the representation of the perfection is also a perfection
[parce que la representation de la perfection en est une aussi ].
This is why it is good to familiarize oneself with objects that
have many perfections. And we must avoid the hate and envy
which prevents us from taking pleasure in these objects. (GR II:
579/SLT: 169, see also RB: 194)
Leibniz, in my view, is a bit unclear here. But this passage (from hereon the
‘pleasure/knowledge passage’) is very insightful once read carefully. Leibniz
begins by claiming that pleasure is the “feeling of some perfection.” Next,
he claims that the perfection that causes pleasure can be instantiated in
a variety of places–in us and in the universe. But then, Leibniz makes an
important clarification to this statement: perfection does not immediately
cause pleasure, rather, it does so mediately through knowledge: “for when we
notice it [the perfection], this very knowledge excites some further perfection
in us.” This clarification is key, for it shows that it is knowledge of perfection
that gives rise to the feeling or perception of perfection (pleasure).
Notice that Leibniz is also unclear about what pleasure represents. He
seems to leave it open, allowing for pleasure to represent a multitude of
di↵erent kinds of perfections. This is because Leibniz suggests that pleasure
is about the same perfection that the knowledge which gives rise to it is
about. Given that we can have knowledge of any kind of perfection, Leibniz
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seems to commit himself to the view that pleasure can be about aDiversity
of Perfections:
DP: If the knowledge that gives rise to some pleasure is about (any)
perfection x, then the pleasure that arises from that knowledge
will also be about perfection x.
It seems that other intentionalist readings of Leibnizian pleasure are com-
mitted to Diversity of Perfections, as they implicitly leave open the
possibility that pleasure can be about any perfection. In general, I think this
is problematic—at least on a strong intentionalist reading—because it is un-
clear what would unite token pleasures as being the same type of mental
state given that their essential nature on this view is exhausted by their rep-
resentational content. If pleasure can be about any type of perfection, what
makes a pleasure about perfection x, the same kind of thing as a pleasure
about perfection y?
But Diversity of Perfections is something Leibniz cannot abide, for
in other texts, he claims (or so I will argue) that the object of pleasure is
always the perfection of power. That is, Leibniz is actually committed to the
claim that pleasure is always about a Singular Perfection:
SP: While the knowledge that (can) give rise to pleasure may be about
(any) perfection x, the pleasure that arises from this knowledge
of x is always about the perfection of power, p.
One final note about the pleasure/knowledge passage. Leibniz reveals a com-
mitment to a principle concerning the nature of perfection that will prove
useful in illustrating his commitment to (1) the representationality of plea-
sure and (2) why the representational nature of pleasure renders both plea-
sure and happiness perfections of the mind. I will call this the principle of
Representational Perfection:
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RP: If a mental state, M, accurately represents some perfection, P,
then M is a perfection as well.28
Leibniz is clearly committed to the principle of Representational Per-
fection,29 and explicitly applies it to pleasure in the pleasure/knowledge
passage: “the representation of the perfection is also a perfection”. The con-
text of the pleasure/knowledge passage reveals that ‘representation of per-
fection’ refers to pleasure, and thus Leibniz is claiming that pleasure is a
perfection as well. Notice that this text implies that Leibniz does think that
pleasure is intentional, and he commits himself to the further claim that
pleasure is a perfection of its own kind because of this.30
3.4 Strong Intentionalism
Let us now turn to the evidence for a strong intentionalist reading of pleasure.
The principle of Representational Perfection clearly commits Leibniz
to the claim that pleasure is intentional, but it does not commit him to the
claim that pleasure is wholly intentional. As such, the weak intentionalist
reading is still an option. Here, I want to consider a key text that tips the
scale in favor of a strong intentionalist reading. In a letter to Christian Wol↵
(1705), Leibniz writes:
We are not able to give a nominal definition of pleasure (volup-
tatis), and pleasantness (suavitas) is no more familiar than plea-
28The qualification of accuracy is crucial because it will in part explain why sensory
pleasures do not count as a perfection. As I will argue below (section 5.1), sensory pleasures
are a misrepresentation of an increase in power. As such, sensory pleasures are not about
a perfection at all, and thus cannot count as a representational perfection.
29It is beyond the scope of this paper to o↵er a full explanation of the principle of Rep-
resentational Perfection. But I believe that Leibniz’s broader metaphysical commit-
ments provide grounds for this principle. See Mercer’s discussion of “emanative harmony”
as a grounds for the principle of Representational Perfection (2001: 209-217).
30My claim here is that insofar as pleasure is a representation of the perfection of power,
it does not follow from the principle of Representational Perfection that pleasure
is another instance of the perfection of power as well. Rather, pleasure is a perfection of
its own kind (I will leave open what that is for the purposes of this paper).
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sure (voluptas); yet pleasure admits of a real definition, and I
think it is nothing other than a sense of perfection (sensum per-
fectionis). (GW: 18)31
To unpack this passage, we need to say something about Leibniz’s theory of
definitions (Puryear 2012: 235-40). According to Leibniz, a nominal definition
of x identifies some set of external or distinguishing features of x such that one
could recognize x upon first encountering x. However, a nominal definition
of x does not identify the essence of x. For example, specifying that gold is
heavy, yellow, and insoluble in aqua fortis would serve as a nominal definition
of gold, but such distinguishing features do not capture the essence of gold.
A real definition, on the other hand, would identify the essence of x and
thereby establish its possibility. For example, Leibniz writes:
The concept of a circle set up by Euclid, that of a figure described
by the motion of a straight line in a plane about a fixed end,
a↵ords a real definition, for such a figure is evidently possible. (L:
230)
In claiming that a nominal definition of pleasure does not exist, Leibniz is
implying that one could not identify pleasure without having experienced it.
Nonetheless, we can give a real definition of pleasure, namely, that it consists
in a perception of perfection. Still, even if one knows the real definition of
pleasure, one would still not know what it is like to experience pleasure. There
is much to say about why we cannot have a nominal definition of pleasure,32
31Translation from Strickland (http://www.leibniz-translations.com/wol↵.htm). Simi-
larly, Leibniz writes in the New Essays : “although pleasure cannot be given a nominal
definition, and more than light or heat can, it can like them be defined causally” (RB:
194). A causal definition, according to Leibniz, is just a kind of real definition (Puryear
2012: 236).
32Again, this goes back to the point made in Section 2 about the a↵ective status of
pleasure on a strong intentionalist reading. Perhaps it is the a↵ective nature of pleasure
that prevents us from providing a nominal definition–one cannot know what it is like to
experience pleasure until one experiences it.
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but the upshot for present purposes is that Leibniz is claiming that pleasure
is essentially a representational state–that is, a representation of perfection.
As such, Leibniz is committed to a strong intentionalist account of pleasure.
And I will maintain this going forward.
Having established that Leibniz is a strong intentionalist, we need to say
something about the a↵ective nature of pleasure. Recall, according to strong
intentionalism, the a↵ective qualities of pleasure are exhausted by the content
of pleasure. I do not think that there is any direct textual evidence to settle
this matter. Nonetheless, I think that Leibniz has the resources to o↵er an
explanation along the lines given by contemporary intentionalists.
Allow me to briefly speculate about how this could work. A standard
move for the strong intentionalist is to claim that whatever property plea-
sure represents, it represents that property as good (a positive valuational
property). Similarly, whatever property pain represents (say, tissue damage)
it represents that property as bad (a negative valuational property). As Tye
writes: “To experience tissue damage as bad is to undergo an experience
which represents that damage as bad” (2008: 34; cf. Cutter & Tye 2011).
Representing the objects of pleasure and pain as having such valuational
properties, explains why pleasure has a positive valence and pain has a neg-
ative valence.
On this kind of model, then, we need a story about how, whatever proper-
ties Leibnizian pleasure and pain do represent, they represent those properties
as good or bad (respectively). One could simply say just that: whatever Leib-
nizian pleasure and pain represent, they represent that property as good or
bad (respectively). However, I think that there is a more Leibnizian answer
in the vicinity. On the view that I will develop in the next section, pleasure
represents an increase in a substance’s power, and pain represents a decrease
in a substance’s power. Leibniz also describes this as a representation of per-
fection, and a representation of imperfection. Although I will have some brief
remarks about perfection and imperfection in the next section, it is beyond
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the scope of this paper to delve into this di cult topic. Nonetheless, I will say
this: it is plausible that perfection and imperfection are valuational properties
in addition to being strict metaphysical properties in Leibniz’s metaphysics.
Indeed, Leibniz often talks about “the good which is purely metaphysical”
(H: 258). As Youpa writes:
In reuniting goodness and reality, or to what he interchangeably
refers to as perfection, Leibniz thus characteristically recovers and
attempts to restore a doctrine that had currency among medieval
thinkers. (2016)
The upshot is that it is not far-fetched to attribute to Leibniz the following
claims that could explain the a↵ective nature of pleasure and pain:
1. Pleasure represents an increase in power as a perfection.
2. Pain represents a decrease in power as an imperfection.
Again, the details here are tricky, and by no means am I claiming that this
is the best view, all things considered. But in terms of o↵ering some kind of
relevant explanation, Leibniz has the requisite resources.
4 Pleasure, Perfection, and Power
Let us now turn, then, to a detailed analysis of the intentionality of plea-
sure (setting aside, from hereon out, the a↵ective nature of pleasure). What
perfection is pleasure about? I will argue that pleasure always represents an
increase in a substance’s power. As such, Leibniz is committed to Singular
Perfection, not Diversity of Perfections.
Leibniz often claims that pleasure represents power, and I too will speak
this way for convenience. However, the claim that pleasure represents power
is actually just shorthand for the claim that pleasure represents an increase
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in a substance’s power. But this is a substantive substitution, and I will give
an argument for why we should read the claim that pleasure represents power
as the claim that pleasure represents an increase in a substance’s power.
Let us start with a couple texts that, at the very least, suggest that
pleasure represents power. For example, In On Wisdom (ca. 1690) Leibniz
writes:
Perfection shows itself in great freedom and power of action, since
all being consists in a kind of power; and the greater the power,
the higher and freer the being. (G VII: 87/L: 426)
If pleasure is a perception of perfection, and perfection “shows itself in great
freedom and power of action,” then it is reasonable to claim that a perception
of perfection is a representation of power. Regarding joy and pleasure more
specifically, Leibniz writes that joy,
which a person can always create for himself when his mind is
sound, consists in the feeling of pleasure in himself and in the
powers of his mind. (G VII: 89/L: 427; see also L: 136-7)
Let us look at a more definitive text. In a 1677 letter to Arnold Eckhard,
Leibniz claims that pleasure consists in “consciousness of power.” Leibniz’s
correspondence with Eckhard concerns whether simple sensible qualities can
be counted among the divine perfections. In this context, Leibniz turns to
the nature of pleasure and pain:
There is more perfection or reality in a mind which su↵ers than in
an indi↵erent one which is neither enjoying nor su↵ering, so that
in a metaphysical sense, pain too is a perfection. But since plea-
sure is also a metaphysical perfection [voluptas est etiam perfectio
metaphysica], it seems that we must ask whether pain or pleasure
is the greater perfection, metaphysically speaking. It seems that
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pleasure is the greater perfection, because it is the consciousness
of power [conscientia potentiae], while pain is the consciousness of
powerlessness conscientia imbecillitatis ]. But powerlessness, again
speaking metaphysically, is an imperfection [imperfectio], and the
consciousness of metaphysical imperfection is less perfect, again
speaking metaphysically, than the consciousness of metaphysical
perfection. So pain implies a certain imperfection in the su↵ering
subject. (G I: 266/L: 177)33
Leibniz’s comparison of the metaphysical status of pleasure and pain should
be read against the backdrop of the principle of Representational Per-
fection. Recall, this principle states that: if a mental state, M, accurately
represents some perfection, P, then M is a perfection as well. The reason
why pleasure is a metaphysical perfection is because pleasure consists in
“consciousenss of power” or in more precise terms given Leibniz’s represen-
tationalism, a representation of power. Power is a perfection of substances,
and qua perfection it consists in a certain “degree or quantity of reality or
essence” as indicated earlier in the letter (Ibid.). The reason why pain is “less
perfect” than pleasure is because pain consists in “consciousness of powerless-
ness”, that is, a representation of powerlessness (or weakness). Powerlessness
is an imperfection: it does not indicate a degree of reality or essence. As such,
33There is one text (ca. 1683) where Leibniz seems to contradict the claim that pleasure
represents power. In a note on Descartes’ Passions of the Soul Leibniz writes: “Descartes
thinks that the cause of pleasure consists in the feeling of our powers, provided of course
that we realize that we strongly resist something making an attack on us. I think that
is only a corollary. For generally, everything that assists an action or performance brings
about pleasure, but assistance is chiefly perceived in danger, because then it is perceived
more exquisitely. And, if every pleasure consists solely in the knowledge of our strength,
not only would beasts not feel pleasure, which Descartes would concede, but neither would
we perceive the signs of pleasure in them” (A VI 4: 1488-9, translated by Strickland
http://www.leibniz-translations.com/pleasure.htm). This text appears later than the let-
ter to Eckhard, which would suggest that this is Leibniz’s considered view. However, the
claim that pleasure represents power is also expressed in later texts as well–e.g. the Dis-
course (1686)–which suggests that Leibniz did not abandon this position.
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pain reveals a metaphysical imperfection in the su↵ering subject.34
This is one of the clearest texts where Leibniz claims that pleasure rep-
resents power. But notice that he does not claim that pleasure represents
an increase in a substance’s power.35 Why should we read him as implying
this more specific claim? There are two main reasons for this reading: direct
textual evidence, and broader systematic considerations.
There are two types of texts that help us see that Leibniz’s considered
view is that pleasure represents an increase in power. First, there are texts
that claim that perfection itself consists in an increase or improvement in
reality or being. For example, Leibniz writes: “I call any elevation [Erhöhung ]
of being [des Wesens ] a perfection [Vollkommenheit ]” (G VII: 87/L: 426).
Second, Leibniz explicitly claims that “pleasure is the awareness of increasing
perfection” (M: 88).36 Taking all the texts considered together, I think the
best reading is that pleasure represents an increase in a substance’s power.
Before turning to deeper systematic considerations in favor of this view,
let us briefly pause to consider what it means for a substance to increase
in power. Leibniz examines power in a range of texts, and by no means do
I want to o↵er a definitive view of Leibnizian power and its metaphysical
34It is interesting, however, that Leibniz concedes that pain, in a certain sense, does
involve perfection, because a mind that is su↵ering has more perfection than one that is
indi↵erent. I do not think that this claim is in real tension with the principle of Rep-
resentational Perfection. Broadly put, I think we could say the following: insofar
as pain is a perception, it contributes to the overall degree of reality of a mind (for a
perception has some degree of reality), at least quantitatively. But qualitatively speaking,
it is not a perfection in the same sense as pleasure, for it is not tracking the power of the
substance.
35There is an important clarification here: pleasure represents an increase in a rational
substance’s own power. However, I am not thereby implying that pleasure cannot be
distally caused by an increase in another substance’s power. I think Leibniz’s considered
view (and I cannot flesh that out here), is that a substance x can increase in power (and
experience pleasure) through acquiring knowledge of another substance y’s increase in
power and experience of pleasure. These metaphysical, epistemic, and ethical relationships
are crucial for Leibniz’s theories of love and moral progress (see, e.g., RB: 163; GR II:
579/R: 83).
36Translated by Hostler (1975: 23).
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status within a Leibnizian substance.37 Instead, I would like to provide a
general framework for understanding power, so that we can have a better
sense of exactly what pleasure represents. Here, I will focus primarily on the
discussion of power in the New Essays, for there the discussion of power is
situated within a broader discussion of ethics.
In Chapter xxi, Leibniz writes that “power [potentia/la puissance] in
general, then, can be described as the possibility of change” (RB: 169). But
change requires actualization of power. So when this possibility is actualized,
we can distinguish between active power and passive power. Active power
consists in a substance–albeit ideally–causing change in another substance.
Passive power consists in a substance (the patient) undergoing change–albeit
ideally–due to the actions of another substance (the agent). As such, one can
think of active power as a “faculty” and passive power as a “capacity” (RB:
169). For example, a teacher has the faculty of imparting knowledge, and a
student has the capacity of learning. However, while the student’s mind (the
dominant monad) is passive in some respects (perhaps corresponding to the
ways in which her organs are being a↵ected by the actions of the teacher), it
is also becoming active as it acquires knowledge. She is now in a position to
act in the world in new ways given her newfound knowledge. On balance, the
thought goes, the student is actually increasing in perfection (i.e. power).38
Given the distinctions between general power, active power, and passive
power, there are three readings of the claim a substance increases in power :
Gen-P: A substance increases in general power, that is, the possibility
of change.39
Act-P: A substance increases in active power, that is, they are e↵ecting
37For more detailed discussions of the status of power within substances, see Jorati
(2019) and Rutherford (2013).
38For further discussion of this particular case, and various philosophical problems that
arise from Leibniz’s account of actvity and passivity, see Kneale (1972).
39There are actually two readings of this claim: an increase in the possibility of active
power, and an increase in the possibility of passive power.
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change in other substances.
Pass-P: A substance increases in passive power, that is, they are being
a↵ected by other substances.
Which reading or readings does Leibniz intend? My contention is that plea-
sure can represent either an increase in general power or an an increase in
active power. It cannot represent an increase in passive power. This is because
pleasure is supposed to be a perception of perfection, and passive power is
not a genuine perfection of a substance. As we will see below, passive power
is what causes pain or su↵ering. In short, when we experience pleasure there
are two possible scenarios: the pleasure is either representing an increase in
the possibility to e↵ect (active) change or representing an increase in activity.
With this discussion of power in place, let us now turn to the systematic
reasons for claiming that pleasure represents an increase in power. It makes
sense that pleasure would represent an increase in a substance’s power, given
Leibniz’s views on the relationship between knowledge, power, and pleasure.
The basic idea is intuitive and straightforward: when we acquire knowledge,
we acquire a metaphysical perfection, and thus we increase in our capacity
for action or we become active (Rutherford 1995: 48-9). Consider Discourse
§15:
Thus a substance. . . becomes limited in proportion to its more
or less perfect manner of expression. This, then, is how one can
conceive that substances impede or limit each other, and conse-
quently one can say that, in this sense, they act upon one another
and are required, so to speak, to accommodate themselves to one
another. For it can happen that a change that increases the ex-
pression of one diminishes that of another...Whenever something
exercises its e cacy or power [puissance], that is, when it acts
[agit ], it improves and extends [en mieux et s’étend ] itself insofar
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as it acts. Therefore, when a change takes place by which sev-
eral substances are a↵ected (in fact every change a↵ects all of
them), I believe one may say that the substance which imme-
diately passes to a greater degree of perfection [passe à un plus
grand degré de perfection] or to a more perfect expression exer-
cises its power [exerce sa puissance] and acts, and the substance
which passes to a lesser degree shows its weakness [foiblesse] and
is acted upon. I also hold that every action of a substance which
has perfection involves some pleasure [volupté], and every pas-
sion some pain [douleur ]and vice versa. However, it can happen
that a present advantage is destroyed by a greater evil in what
follows, whence one can sin in acting, that is, in exercising one’s
power and finding pleasure [plaisir ]. (G IV: 440-1/AG: 48; see
also Monadology §49-52)40
Here, I think that Leibniz should be read as claiming that pleasure represents
an increase in a substance’s active power. Here is how this works. When a
substance, S1, acquires knowledge (a metaphysical perfection), S1 increases
in active power, and is thus active with respect to some other substance,
S2 (who is now passive with respect to S1). When S1 is active in this way,
S1 experiences pleasure (a further metaphysical perfection). S2, however, is
passive and thus will experience pain.41
40In a similar vein, Leibniz writes in the New Essays that “if we take ‘action’ to be an
endeavour towards perfection, and ‘passion’ to be the opposite, then genuine substances
are active only when their perceptions (for I grant perceptions to all of them) are become
better developed and more distinct, just as they are passive only when their perceptions
are becoming more confused. Consequently, in substances which are capable of pleasure
and pain every action is a move toward pleasure, ever passion a move toward pain” (RB:
210).
41Strictly speaking, in Discourse §15 Leibniz claims that “it can happen that a change
that increases the expression of one diminishes that of another.” This qualification suggests
a weaker reading of this passage, whereby it is possible for S1 to be active with respect
to S2, yet S2 does not decrease in perfection (it may maintain its degree of perfection or
even increase in perfection as well). Whether Leibniz intended this possibility is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, the weaker reading is still consistent with the general
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Figure 1: Generation of Pleasure
As Leibniz similarly writes:
The impulse to action arises from a striving toward perfection,
the sense of which is pleasure, and there is no action or will on
any other basis. (L: 424; emphasis added).42
Although Leibniz does not make it explicit that pleasure is a representation
of an increase in S1’s active power, everything he says here (taken together
with the prior texts) suggests that this is his considered view.
5 Leibnizian Happiness
Reading pleasure as a representation of an increase in a substance’s power
helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. First, it o↵ers us a more
interpretation on o↵er. That is, it still the case that when S1 becomes active and exercises
its power, it experiences pleasure (a representation of that increase in power).
42Roinila makes a similar observation: “According to Leibniz, activity brings pleasure
and passivity brings pain. Joy makes men alert, active and hopeful of further success.
However, as the distinctness of perceptions is a matter of degree, activity also comes in
degrees. The more distinctly a substance perceives, the more active it is, and at the same
time, it is more perfect” (2007: 174).
30
precise understanding of the cognitive status of happiness. Second, it helps
us understand the metaphysical status of happiness.
5.1 Happiness as a Mood
Commentators generally gloss happiness as an enduring or lasting state of
pleasure, and Leibniz often characterizes happiness in this way. As such, one
might think that happiness consists in an ongoing series of pleasures. How-
ever, Leibniz’s considered view is more complicated. In Happiness, Leibniz
claims that happiness is a lasting state of joy, and that joy consists of the
predominance of pleasure over pain.
We have established that pleasure consists in a representation of an in-
crease in a substance’s power, whereas pain consists in a representation of
a decrease in a substance’s power (or an increase in weakness). Thus, let us
turn to joy, the predominance of pleasure over pain. Leibniz writes,
Joy is the total pleasure that results from everything the soul feels
at once. This is why one can have joy in the midst of great pains,
when the pleasures that one feels at the same time are su ciently
great and capable of blotting the pains out: just like in the case
of that Spanish slave who, having killed a Carthaginian murdered
of his maters, was beside himself with joy, and made light of the
torments that the torturers were able to invent. (GR II: 582/SLT:
169)
Here, Leibniz suggests that pleasures can outweigh pains, and when they
do, we are in a state of joy. This notion of outweighing does not seem to
be merely a quantitative calculation, that is, one is not in a state of joy
when there are more experiences of pleasure than experiences of pain at
a certain time slice of a rational substance. For this calculation also has
qualitative grounds. Pleasure and pain comes in varying degrees. This allows
for, say, a singular pleasure about a high degree of perfection (i.e. a significant
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increase in power) to outweigh several experiences of pain that are caused by
insignificant decreases in power. In short, we can say that we are in a state of
joy when we are more aware of our power than we are aware of our weakness.
Let us now turn to happiness:
Happiness is a lasting state of joy. This is why our joy and our
pleasure should not have harmful consequences that cause a much
greater or longer lasting sadness or pain. It is in this choice of joys
and pleasures and in the means of obtaining them or avoiding
sadness that consists the science of happiness [i.e. wisdom]. Some
pleasures cause much greater or longer lasting pains, or prevent
greater and more enduring pleasures. And there are pains or dif-
ficulties that are extremely useful and instructive. Thus it is in
their choice, or in the means of obtaining or avoiding them, that
consists the science of happiness. (GR II: 582/SLT: 169)
There are two features of this passage that I want to draw out. First, the
reason why happiness must be grounded in intellectual pleasure. Second,
and relatedly, the cognitive status of happiness, which I claim is a cognitive
process (akin to what we would now call a mood–See Haybron [2001]).
Let us start with the first issue. Leibniz stresses that happiness is ul-
timately grounded in intellectual pleasure as opposed to sensory pleasure,
because unlike sensory pleasure, intellectual pleasure is not conducive to fu-
ture experiences of pain and dips in perfection. Leibniz writes:
The confused perception of some perfection constitutes the plea-
sure of senses, but this pleasure can be [productive] of greater
imperfections, as a fruit with a good taste and a good odor can
conceal a poison. This is why one must shun the pleasures of
senses, as one shuns a stranger, or, sooner, a flattering enemy.
(GR II: 579/R: 83)
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I have bracketed the issue of the nature of sensory pleasure in this paper,
primarily because it deserves its own thorough treatment. However, allow me
to make a brief remark about how we should understand sensory pleasure,
as it will help reveal why Leibniz thinks sensory pleasures are not constitu-
tive of happiness. Sensory pleasure, on the view I prefer, also consists in a
representation of perfection. As such, intellectual pleasure and sensory plea-
sure are unified because they are about the same type of thing. However, the
representation in the case of sensory pleasure is not accurate: it is a misrepre-
sentation of perfection. More specifically, a sensory pleasure misrepresents a
substance as increasing in power, when in fact, it is increasing in weakness.43
For when we engage in bodily activities that are characteristic of produc-
ing sensory pleasures we are ultimately being passive and thus su↵ering. As
Leibniz writes:
We act to attain happiness or a state of enduring joy, and joy is
the sense of perfection. Every thing is to be held as more perfect
to the degree that it is freer by nature; that is, to the degree
that its power is greater over the things that surround it, and its
su↵ering from external things is less. (L: 280)
Happiness, on Leibniz’s view, needs to be grounded in genuine increases in
power. For Leibniz, it is only knowledge of the perfections of God and the
universe that can consistently o↵er us the right kind of increases in power,
43There is a sense in which, some sensory pleasures are about an increase in power. How-
ever, the bases of such sensory pleasures (e.g. dancing, drinking, etc.) are not conducive
to genuine increases in power, that is, the kind of power that is stable and conducive to
the production of future perfection (i.e. knowledge, happiness, and virtue). It is because
sensory pleasures do not represent genuine increases in power which makes them, in re-
ality, misrepresentations of increases in power (i.e. actual representations of increases in
weakness). Now, one might object that sensory pleasures are still important to the life
of a rational substance. Although Leibniz does not explicitly do this, I would appeal to
Descartes’ view on this matter. For Descartes, sensory pleasures (and other contingent
goods) do not contribute to happiness, but they do contribute to well-being (Svensson
2011). Leibniz surely has the resources to make such a distinction.
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and thus the kind of pleasures that are conducive to happiness (H: 282, 297).
This is not to say that we should always avoid objects that induce pain.
Indeed, there are some cases where we must experience pain in order to
experience future pleasure, for there is a significant sense in which acquiring
knowledge is a di cult process. Pursuing knowledge is what helps us acquire
power (and hence freedom), which in turns puts us in a position to be happy.
This leads to the final point on this first issue: namely, the connection
between moral progress (increasing in virtue and happiness) and epistemic
progress. Bracketing the issue of virtue, Leibniz is clear that we need to
make strong epistemic progress in order to sustain our happiness. Although
weak epistemic progress can be a source of pleasure, we cannot–all things
considered–become epistemically static:
I doubt that a greatest pleasure is possible; I am inclined to be-
lieve that it can increase ad infinitum, for we do not know how
far our knowledge and our organs can be developed in the course
of the eternity which lies before us. So I would think that happi-
ness is a lasting pleasure, which cannot occur without a continual
progress to new pleasures. (RB: 194)
In order for happiness to be sustained, we need to progress to new pleasures.
And in order to progress to new pleasures, we need to be consistently ac-
quiring more knowledge of the perfections of the universe and God. Leibniz
is implying that if we do not make such strong epistemic progress–“which
would dull [stupide] our mind” (G VI: 606/AG: 213)–then we will not be
happy.
Let us turn to the second issue concerning happiness. What does it mean
for happiness to be a “lasting state of joy”? By lasting, Leibniz does not mean
that a happy person is, at every moment of her life, experiencing joy. Indeed,
Leibniz claims that “the happy man does not, it is true, feel this joy at every
instant” (L: 425, see also L: 280). As such, the view of happiness as an ongoing
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series of pleasures is problematic. In fact, I would argue that Leibniz would
say that happiness is not a discrete mental state at all. Rather, happiness
is a cognitive process that is akin to a mood. Broadly construed, a mood
encompasses the overall emotional state of a subject, allowing for there to
be experiences that are not characteristic of the overall mood, e.g. instances
of pain (Haybron 2001). As such, happiness is not a particular emotion or
set of emotions (e.g. an experience of pleasure or consistent experiences of
pleasure). It is possible for the happy person to have experiences of pain and
su↵ering. However, in order to qualify as being happy, their experiences of
pleasure must outweigh their experiences of pain (i.e. they must be in a state
of joy); and they can ensure this by having their habits and activities geared
toward the acquisition of knowledge and the exercise of virtue.
5.2 Happiness as a Perfection
Recall, Leibniz claims that happiness is a perfection. For example, he writes
in On the Elements of Natural Science (ca. 1682-84) that “happiness consists
in the perfection of the mind” (L: 279; see also Discourse §36). Why exactly
is happiness a perfection of the mind? Happiness is a mood that represents
(net) increases in power.44 When we are happy, we are consistently more
aware of our power as opposed to our weakness. Given the principle of Rep-
resentational Perfection, it follows straightforwardly that happiness
would be a perfection as well. For if happiness (accurately) represents net
increases in the perfection of power, then it is, by extension, a perfection of
a rational substance as well.
44I am helping myself to the assumption that cognitive processes and moods can be




Leibniz is a strong intentionalist about pleasure. Although Leibniz is some-
times unclear in his descriptions of the nature of pleasure, claiming that
pleasure is both a perception of perfection and caused by a perception of
perfection, these claims are not mutually exclusive–Leibniz intends both of
them. This is the dual perception of perfection reading I am proposing: plea-
sure is a representation of an increase in a substance’s power, that is caused
by knowledge of the perfections of the universe or God. This reveals that
Leibniz has a systematic account of pleasure that fits with his metaphysics
and epistemology. As Leibniz himself states:
Thus we see that happiness, pleasure, love, perfection, being,
power, freedom, harmony, order, and beauty are all tied to each
other, a truth which is rightly perceived by few. (L: 426)
I hope to have made some progress towards unpacking these interconnections,
but of course, there is much more work to be done.45
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